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LIIARC: Should You Even Bother? Making the Case for Bringing a Case
Tuesday 24 November 2026 | 6pm - 7.30pm followed by drinks
Wilberforce Chambers, 77 Chancery Lane
Civil fraud and asset recovery, Commercial disputes, International / offshoreMonday 16 November 2026
Graeme Halkerston and Theo Dixon recently obtained the discharge of an ex parte freezing order granted in England in aid of US federal litigation seeking to freeze assets up to the value of $70m. This note sets out the key issues and lessons for English practitioners in such cases.
Key Points
In EAD Group v Toros [2026] EWHC 2908 (Comm), Dias J discharged an ex parte freezing order made under s.25 of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 in support of US federal proceedings in the Southern District of New York.
The judgment makes three points of importance to practitioners, particularly in s.25 cases and disputes involving parallel substantive or enforcement litigation in other jurisdictions:
The facts
EAD’s claim arose from a margin lending agreement (the “MLA”) with two companies said to be controlled by Mr Toros. EAD started an ICC arbitration against those companies and, separately, sued Mr Toros personally in the Southern District of New York. The losses claimed in the proceedings were some $70m. Mr Toros applied to stay the New York proceedings and compel arbitration (the “Motion to Compel”).
On 11 December 2025, Dias J granted a domestic freezing order under s.25 of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982. The only assets identified were two London flats owned by T London Limited (“T London”), a Jersey company, which was joined as a Chabra respondent. The main evidence that Mr Toros controlled those assets was an entry on the Register of Overseas Entities recording him as a registrable beneficial owner of T London on the basis of “significant influence or control”.
Mr Toros applied to discharge the order for breaches of the duty of full and frank disclosure. EAD applied to continue it.
By the time the return date came on the US substantive proceedings against Mr Toros had been stayed in favour of arbitration pursuant to s.3 of the Federal Arbitration Act.
The decision
The Court upheld each head of non-disclosure alleged by Mr Toros. These included allegations that EAD:
Further, the Court considered that there would have been no jurisdiction to continue the injunction in any event:
The duty to co-operate across borders
The Court accepted that, where litigation runs in several jurisdictions, procedures have to be put in place to keep every legal team up to date with developments in parallel foreign litigation, relying on Moore v Moore [2007] 2 FLR 339 and Lewis v Eliades (No 1) [2002] EWHC 335 (QB).
Lewis had stressed the particular importance of such protocols in s.25 cases. By definition such proceedings had their primary substantive focus in a foreign jurisdiction and it was critical that the English legal team understood properly and were kept fully up to date with developments abroad.
Dias J said at [10]:
“Solicitors and counsel in this jurisdiction have heavy professional responsibilities to the Court, and it is therefore incumbent on them to take steps to ensure that not only their clients but also any foreign lawyers equally understand what is required for compliance with that duty.”
There was no evidence about what processes EAD’s English solicitors had in place, and none from EAD’s US attorneys explaining why critical material had not been passed on. The grant of the Motion to Compel was of “blindingly obvious relevance”, yet EAD’s English team knew nothing of it until Mr Toros’s solicitors told them eight days later. That was a further breach of the continuing duty of full and frank disclosure. The overall impression of the Court was of litigation that had not been handled “in the coordinated and professional way that might have been hoped and expected” (at [12]).
The judgment is just as firm about explanations. EAD’s amounted to “a rather lame confession of inability to explain how or why it occurred” (at [8]). Where a breach is admitted, the Court is entitled to a full explanation of how and why it happened before it can be asked to accept that it was innocent. EAD’s solicitors had described the omission of the Answer as inadvertent without knowing how it came about. If that was based only on instructions, the evidence should have said so.
The lessons are clear. The duty is owed to the English court, and the English team carries it: saying that the US lawyers did not send something is no answer. Someone must be responsible for watching the foreign proceedings after the order is made. An unexplained breach will be treated as an unmitigated one.
Section 25 and proceedings stayed to arbitration
By the return date, Judge Ho had granted the Motion to Compel. The US proceedings were stayed because Mr Toros was entitled to the benefit of the arbitration clause in the MLA. Judge Ho kept the SDNY action against Mr Toros on foot only for the purpose of the supervision of the arbitration. The Federal Arbitration Act mandates a stay to allow the court to provide that supervisory jurisdiction, per Smith v Spizzirri 601 US 472 (2024). No decision on the substance of the dispute between EAD and Mr Toros was envisaged in the US courts.
That was fatal to the order. Applying ETI Euro Telecom International NV v Republic of Bolivia [2009] 1 WLR 665, Dias J held that court proceedings ancillary to arbitration are not substantive proceedings for the purposes of s.25. The only route to a freezing order was s.44 of the Arbitration Act 1996, and no s.44 application was before the Court.
EAD’s argument that it could return to court if the arbitration failed was “misconceived”. As explained at [55], “It cannot conceivably be considered expedient to fire such a weapon against the purely remote and speculative possibility that proceedings might one day be revived in court.”
This explains why the presentation of the Motion to Compel mattered so much at the without notice hearing. A motion with a realistic prospect of success went “to the very foundation of relief under s.25” [21].
The practical lesson is that s.25 cannot support foreign court proceedings that are stayed to arbitration. If there is a prospect of the substantive defendant having the benefit of an arbitration agreement this must be explained to the Court at an ex parte application. Where an arbitration agreement is in play, applicants should consider s.44, with its own conditions, from the start.
Chabra relief and the Register of Overseas Entities
Overseas entities holding UK land must register their “registrable beneficial owners” under the Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act 2022. The test of beneficial ownership is one of significant influence or control, not beneficial ownership in the equitable sense. The government’s guidance says that significant influence or control over a trust can include a right to appoint or remove trustees. A settlor with nothing more than that power may therefore appear on the public register as a “beneficial owner”. Such a power is not sufficient to establish an entitlement to Chabra relief when the settlor is subject to a fiduciary duty in respect of its exercise or the exercise must be made only for proper purposes. Details of trust beneficiaries are not public.
The 2023 government consultation on transparency of land ownership involving trust structures summarised the position under the 2022 Act (HM Government consultation, “Transparency of land ownership involving trusts”: https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/transparency-of-land-ownership-involving-trusts-consultation/transparency-of-land-ownership-involving-trusts.)
“It is important to note that information reported to and published by Companies House focuses on those who have influence and control over the companies themselves, not those who ultimately benefit from or control any land the company may own. These may be the same people, but that is not necessarily the case; for example, the trustees of a trust may have the control/influence over it, but not benefit from its assets, such as land.”
None of this was explained to the Court, and EAD’s evidence was that its legal team were not aware of the guidance at the time of the ex parte application. The judge had been invited to take the entry at face value as an indication of beneficial ownership for Chabra purposes, when it might have been entered to reflect the existence of rights of influence over a trust which would not support a freezing Chabra relief. Because English assets were the only basis for the application, this was “an obviously critical point”:
“It is one thing not to have concrete and watertight evidence at an ex parte stage. It is quite another to invite an inference on the basis of a statement in a register without properly explaining the basis on which that statement was or may have been made.” (at [37]).
The trust deed showed what lay behind the entry. The flats were held on an irrevocable Jersey trust for the benefit of Mr Toros’s son. Mr Toros was the settlor. He was not a beneficiary, could not add himself as one, and could not remove trustees. His powers to appoint trustees and a protector were fiduciary.
The Chabra case therefore failed. Following Algosaibi v Saad Investments Co Ltd [2011] (1) CILR 178, control by the cause-of-action defendant is not enough, and nor is the possibility that the non-cause-of-action defendant might choose to make the assets available to the substantive litigation defendant. The defendant must be capable of being compelled, by some process of enforcement, to make them available. With no English assets in such a category, no order could properly be made.
The lesson is that a register entry shows control as the statute defines it, not equitable ownership. An applicant relying on one should explain the statutory test and qualify any inference.
Comment
EAD confirms that an arbitration stay of foreign proceedings prevents reliance upon those proceedings for the purposes of s.25 injunctions. It also sets out important guidance for parties seeking to rely upon the Register of Overseas Entities to support allegations of beneficial interests.
However, the key takeaway from the decision is the firm approach taken to cross-border co-operation, placing the burden squarely on English legal teams to ensure that foreign attorneys involved in parallel litigation fully brief them on matters relevant to an injunction application and developments after an ex parte injunction has been obtained. The need to set up, explain and comply with information sharing protocols is vital and EAD provides a clear basis to assist English practitioners in demanding such procedures are put in place and maintained.
Graeme Halkerston and Theo Dixon, instructed by Mishcon de Reya, acted for Mr Toros, the first respondent.
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