Judgment handed down in Greensill claim between Credit Suisse and Softbank
Lord Justice Miles has today handed down his judgment in the case of Credit Suisse Virtuoso SICAV-SIF & Anr -v- Softbank Group Corp. & Ors [2025] EWHC 2631 (Ch) under section 423 of the Insolvency Act 1986.
Daniel Lewis, instructed by Charles Russell Speechlys Partners James Hyne and Joseph Evans, with support from Senior Associate Jamie Tilling and Associates Georgina Bernard and Quentin de la Bastide, acted for the Seventh Defendant, Greensill Limited acting by its joint liquidators, Geoffrey Rowley and Paul Allen of FRP Advisory.
Greensill Limited was part of the Greensill Capital group of financial services companies founded by Lex Greensill, which collapsed into insolvency in 2021.
The First Claimant – a sub-fund of Credit Suisse – had invested in loan notes with a face value of $440 million (referred to in the judgment as the “Fairymead Notes”). By what are referred to as the “Impugned Transactions” Greensill was left without assets and Credit Suisse was deprived of security.
The Claimants succeeded in establishing that: (i) the relevant transactions were the two Impugned Transactions and not a wider network of transactions relied upon by Softbank; (ii) the Impugned Transactions were at an undervalue; and (iii) that Greensill Limited (by Lex Greensill) had the relevant purpose under section 423. That Credit Suisse was a victim of the Impugned Transactions was not in issue. The Court also rejected an argument that the remedy should take into account the “fault” of the Claimants (there being no defence of contributory negligence nor causation requirement under sections 423 or 425).
Nonetheless, Lord Justice Miles declined to order relief against Softbank, which was recognised in the Supreme Court’s decision in BTI 2014 LLC v Sequana SA to be an “exceptional” result. That result was said to be justified because this was not the typical straightforward case of transfer of an asset by the debtor to a third party and because the value of the assets transferred fell to nil through no fault or action of Softbank.
This was, therefore, one of those very rare cases where all the constituent elements of section 423 were made out, but the Court nonetheless refused to order any relief and dismissed the claim.
Judgment handed down in Mentmore Golf Investments Limited v Gaymer
On 13 October 2025, judgment was handed down by Sir Anthony Mann in the appeal in Mentmore Golf Investments Limited v Gaymer [2025] EWHC 2604 (Ch). The Appellant had brought a claim for relief from forfeiture as chargee of a lease of a golf course, of which Mr Gaymer is the freeholder and lessor. At the time at which the Appellant’s claim for relief from forfeiture was brought, an order for possession had been made against the tenant, Mentmore Greenland Limited, in separate possession proceedings. Mr Gaymer then applied to strike out the Appellant’s claim / obtain summary judgment, by which time the order for possession had been executed. The first instance judge granted the application and ordered that the Appellant’s claim for relief from forfeiture be struck out, alternatively granting summary judgment to the Respondent landlord, Mr Gaymer.
Broadly speaking, the issues on appeal were as follows:
1. Where a mortgagee applies to the court for relief from forfeiture of a lease, after the possession order is made against the tenant, but before it is executed, does the subsequent execution prevent the claim for relief on the footing the landlord is no longer ‘proceeding’ for the purposes of s.146 of the Law of Property Act 1925?
2. If so, does the mortgagee have to get the possession order and the possession set aside before it can proceed further (i.e. to claim relief)?
3. If not, and the claim for relief is sustainable as a matter of law, did the facts alleged in the instant case (regarding an alleged close relationship or connection between the tenant and the Appellant) make the Appellant’s application an abuse of process such that it should be struck out?
On appeal, Sir Anthony Mann reversed the decision to grant summary judgment, but upheld the first instance judge’s strike-out on grounds the Appellant’s claim was an abuse of process, though for different reasons to those given at first instance.
In reaching its decision in the appeal, the Judge held that:
1. The issue of proceedings is the point of time at which the right to apply for relief from forfeiture “falls to be tested”. Accordingly, since the Appellant’s claim had been made before the order for possession had been executed, it was made in time.
2. Sections 146(2) and (4) do not require a mortgagee to apply for relief from forfeiture in the landlord’s possession proceedings. The fact that a claim for relief has been started in separate proceedings does not, in itself, mean those proceedings have not been properly constituted.
As regards abuse of process, the Appellant’s claim was found to be “part of a scheme to string out a piece of litigation… rather than being a genuine claim advanced by an independent mortgagee seeking to protect its own interests”. So, although the first instance judge’s stated reasons for striking out the Appellant’s claim did not justify a strike out, it was nevertheless liable to be struck out.
John McGhee KC and Harriet Holmes, instructed by Mark Reading and Michael Clarke of Mishcon de Reya LLP, acted for the Appellant.
Joanne Wicks KC and Alex Hill-Smith of New Square Chambers, instructed by Philip Shaw of Knights LLP, acted for the Respondent.
Judgment in Almacantar Centre Point Nominee No.1 Ltd & Anr v De Valk & Ors
On 16 September 2025, the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) handed down in its decision in Almacantar Centre Point Nominee No.1 Ltd & Anr v De Valk & Ors [2025] UKUT 298 (LC), an appeal against the FTT’s determination that paragraph 8 of Schedule 8 to the Building Safety Act 2022 prevented Almacantar, the freeholder landlord, from recovering the costs of replacing the original 1960s façade on Centre Point House, part of the Centre Point estate near Tottenham Court Road, from leaseholders who hold qualifying leases, on the basis the façade works are “cladding remediation” for the purposes of paragraph 8. The original façade comprises a timber-frame and single-glazed windows above spandrel panels. Over time, its condition had deteriorated and it now requires full replacement. The Upper Tribunal dismissed the appeal, concluding the works to ‘the façade’ is ‘cladding remediation’ within the meaning of paragraph 8.
This is the second decision in the Upper Tribunal on the construction of paragraph 8 of Schedule 8 to the BSA (the other case was Lant Street [2024] UKUT 135 (LC)), but this case raised several issues which had not been considered before. If the Upper Tribunal’s decision stands, then the current position is that:
- Paragraph 8 of Schedule 8 “is simply outside of the main leaseholder protection scheme” in that it is not a provision which concerns the remediation of relevant defects, nor is ‘cladding remediation’ a relevant measure to address relevant defects.
- What is ‘cladding’ falls to be determined as a question of fact, as does the question of whether the ‘cladding system’ is ‘unsafe’, which does not have a limited ambit and encompasses a range of threats to the safety of the building or its residents or nearby members of the public.
- In consequence:
a) anything of whatever age that can properly be described as a ‘cladding system’ and that is ‘unsafe’ will fall within the scope of paragraph 8, regardless of whether it is unsafe due to fire, structural issues or other as a result of other hazards or safety concerns;
b) leaseholders cannot seek remediation orders and landlords cannot seek remediation contribution orders in relation to ‘cladding remediation’;
c) the 30-year timeframe that applies to ‘relevant defects’ is of no relevance such that it does not matter when the ‘cladding system’ was placed on a building or when it became ‘unsafe’ – the mere fact the ‘cladding system’ is ‘unsafe’ is sufficient to engage paragraph 8 and prevent a landlord from recovering any service from those who hold qualifying leaseholders;
d) the explanatory notes published with the BSA and which suggest otherwise must, therefore, be wrong;
e) the Upper Tribunal in giving guidance in Lant Street was wrong to suggest that one of the steps to take when deciding whether paragraph 8 is engaged is to ask whether “the relevant measures in respect of which the service charge is claimed comprise the removal or replacement of any part of a cladding system”.
4. A landlord, on advice, who genuinely (if wrongly) considers the BSA is of no application to their remediation works and thus does not call for leaseholder certificates, nevertheless runs the risk of the FTT determining which leaseholders hold a qualifying lease.
Martin Hutchings KC and Harriet Holmes, instructed by Bryan Cave Leighton Paisner LLP, act for the appellants.
Judgment handed down in UBS AG v Kei and ors
Alice Hawker represented the successful Claimant in UBS AG v Kei and ors in securing a possession order to enforce a loan of £46.8 million, an order to transfer up to the High Court for enforcement and dismissing a counterclaim for £5.5 million. During the six-day trial, the Court considered issues of promissory estoppel, proprietary estoppel, unjust enrichment, negligent misstatement, and the Court’s discretion under s. 36 of the Administration of Justice Act 1970 in circumstances where there are freezing orders expressly prohibiting dealing with the property.
Alice was instructed by the brilliant team at Simmons & Simmons, and in particular Alexander Thavenot, James Voos, and Craig Gilchrist.
Judgment handed down in Glint Pay Ltd & Ors v Jason Baker & Geoffrey Rowley
On 18 August 2025 judgment was handed down in the case of Glint Pay Ltd & Ors v Jason Baker & Geoffrey Rowley [2025] EWHC 2166 (Ch). The case concerned a claim that the defendant insolvency practitioners had been invalidly appointed administrators by the floating charge holders. The claimants argued that a) there had been no events of default entitling the floating charge holder to appoint; b) that the floating charge holder had had an improper purpose in making the appointment in that they had purchased the debt and the floating charge for the purpose of acquiring the business of the claimants and that if there had been events of default they had been manufactured. The claimants’ case was that the invalid appointment meant that the defendants were trespassers and were liable to compensate the claimant companies for the loss of profits caused by the administration. The oddity in the case was that the administrators had rescued the companies as going concerns.
The defendants applied to strike out the claimants’ claims and for an order of reverse summary judgment. Mr Simon Gleeson (sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court) in a well-reasoned judgment found in favour of the defendants.
Danapak Flexibles Retirement Benefits Scheme & Contribution Notices
On 1 August 2025, the Upper Tribunal handed down judgment in Pelgrave v TPR [2025] UKUT 00257 (TCC). The case is only the third time the Upper Tribunal has considered the power to issue a Contribution Notice under s.38 of the Pensions Act 2004, and the first involving a continuing employer. The Upper Tribunal decided to increase the sum of the Contribution Notice from that decided upon by the Determinations Panel, and made comments of general application about (i) the role of the Upper Tribunal when hearing a reference, (ii) the meaning of being “party to” an act in s.38 PA04, (iii) the operation of the “material detriment” test in s.38A PA04 in the context of a continuing employer, and (iv) the assessment of what sum is reasonable to impose by way of liability, including how to take account of benefits received by a Target, any tax paid on those benefits, and the passage of time between the relevant events and the UT hearing.
Tom Robinson KC acted for TPR.
Jennifer Seaman and Victoria Leigh at Squire Patton Boggs acted for another target, Robert Paul Wrigley, before TPR’s Determinations Panel in November 2023 who did not make a reference to the Upper Tribunal.
Dinsdale v Fowell features in the national press
Jonathan Davey KC and Elizabeth Houghton have acted in the case of Dinsdale v Fowell, which has featured in the national press.
The case concerns a claim by Jonathan and Elizabeth’s client, who believed herself to have validly married the deceased in 2017, to reasonable financial provision under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975. The claim is unique in two respects; first, it is accepted (and the Court has declared) that the claimant is entitled to claim as a “spouse” pursuant to section 25(4) of the 1975 Act, being a person who in good faith entered into a void marriage with the deceased. There are no previous reported cases in which a claimant has been successful in claiming under that section.
Secondly, the claimant sought and was granted a payment for interim provision pursuant to section 5 of the 1975 Act. The estate was ordered to pay interim provision in the amount of £50,000 plus VAT. There is only one other reported case in which a claimant was successful in seeking interim provision under the 1975 Act.
The case will now proceed to a final hearing to determine Jonathan and Elizabeth’s client’s entitlement.
Jonathan and Elizabeth are instructed by Mohaned Salah at Perilli & Ho.
Links to press coverage:
Judgment handed down in Core VCT v Soho Square Capital and others
On 25 July 2025 judgment was handed down by Tom Smith KC, sitting as deputy high court judge, in Core VCT v Soho Square Capital and others [2025] EWHC 1918 (Ch), a decision concerning the law of amendment to plead new causes of action and the application of section 32 of the Limitation Act in the context of summary judgment applications. Three venture capital trusts, acting by their liquidators, had brought claims against a number of defendants. The claimants sought, unsuccessfully, to rely on a principle of “wrongdoer control” to postpone the running of time under section 32.
Thomas Grant KC led Jonathan Allcock of Maitland Chambers, instructed by Guy Harper and Tayla Dyer of Stephenson Harwood LLP on behalf of the 9th and 10th Defendants, against whom all claims were dismissed.
Daniel Lewis led by Catherine Addy KC and led Charles King of Maitland Chambers, instructed by Harcus Parker on behalf of the Applicants and Claimants.
The Lawyer features victory in legal battle over landmark Birmingham development
Following judgment being handed down last week, The Lawyer has featured an article about the long-running legal battle over Birmingham’s landmark development.
Daniel Lewis, instructed by Shakespeare Martineau partner James Woolstenhulme and his team Alex Ryan and Natalie Thorpe, acted successfully for the claimants. They secured a major victory for Sanman Property Management in a lengthy battle against Birmingham developer Samuel Ginda and his companies regarding the Broad Street development known as The Square. The High Court has dismissed a third attempt by Ginda’s firms — 2020 Living Ltd, Taylor Grange 2 Ltd, and TGDM One Ltd — to lift a court sanction preventing them from defending against claims of conspiracy and breach of contract.
The case revolves around a multimillion-pound development including a 220-room hotel and a 30-storey residential tower. Sanman claims it funded the land acquisition via a loan but was unlawfully excluded from profits through transactions allegedly orchestrated by Ginda.
Following non-compliance with disclosure obligations, Sanman successfully obtained orders debarring the defendants from defending the claims. The court ruled in Sanman’s favour at a 2024 liability trial (at which Daniel Lewis appeared with Max Mallin KC), concluding Ginda had deliberately conspired to exclude Sanman. Co-claimant Midland Premier Properties also secured a £500 million judgment against another developer, Rakesh Doal.
Despite multiple attempts by the defendants to overturn the sanctions, all have been rejected, with the latest dismissal in June 2025. The court has already ordered interim payments of £1.7 million to Sanman, and the final damages could reach eight figures. The case involved over four years of litigation, nearly 50 court orders, and more than 30,000 pages of evidence.
An appeal from dismissal of an earlier application for relief by the defendant is due to be heard in the Court of Appeal. A final hearing to decide on the amount owed to Sanman has yet to be scheduled.
Subscribers to The Lawyer can read the full article by clicking the link below:
Shakespeare Martineau triumphs in battle over landmark Birmingham development
Judgment handed down in Cooper v Ludgate House Ltd and Powell v Ludgate House Ltd
Fancourt J today gave judgment in the long awaited case of Cooper v Ludgate House Ltd and Powell v Ludgate House Ltd in which the owners of two adjoining flats sought an injunction to require the developer of the Bankside Yards development to pull down part of the development on the grounds that it interfered with their rights of light.
John McGhee KC acted for the developer leading Kester Lees KC and was instructed by Matthew Baker, Sarah Campey and Pierre Smith of Pinsent Masons LLP.
The court refused injunctive relief and awarded the flat owners only a small proportion of the sums they had sought as damages in lieu of an injunction.