“You’re acting like a child…”

Claims by adult children under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975
Article by Naomi Kilcoyne, 3 November 2025

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This article considers the recent case of Isaacs v Green & Others [2025] EWHC 1951 (Fam). The case was heard before Mr David Rees KC, sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court, on 23 and 24 July 2025, with judgment being handed down on 25 July 2025.

The case is an interesting illustration of some of the specific issues which can arise in ‘dependency’ claims brought by adult children under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 (the “1975 Act”). Formerly, claims by adult children were understood to be far more difficult than claims by minor children, whose financial needs and dependency on the deceased were typically more obvious. As such, it was generally assumed that, short of exceptional circumstances, adult child claimants under the 1975 Act were unlikely to succeed.

However, Isaacs v Green is the latest in a line of successful claims following the Supreme Court’s decision in Ilott v The Blue Cross & Others [2017] UKSC 17, the leading authority on claims by adult children under the 1975 Act. This trend in the case law accordingly suggests that successful claims may not be as rare as previously assumed. On the right facts, courts may well prove willing to be generous to meritorious child claimants – whatever their age.

The legal framework

The 1975 Act is in many ways radical, in that it permits the court to interfere with and disrupt the disposition of the deceased’s estate by will or under the rules of intestacy. This is a statutory exception to the fundamental (and otherwise unchallenged) principle of testamentary freedom, whereby “an Englishman still remains at liberty at his death to dispose of his own property in whatever way he pleases or, if he chooses to do so, to leave that disposition to be regulated by the laws of intestate succession” (In re Coventry [1980] Ch 461 at 474-475 per Oliver J).

This statutory exception is particularly relevant in the context of claims by children. In England and Wales, unlike most civil law jurisdictions, there is no system of ‘forced heirship’ whereby children are protected as heirs and guaranteed a portion of the estate. Short of challenging the validity of the will itself, or bringing a claim on the basis of proprietary estoppel, a claim under the 1975 Act is the only route open to a child who feels that they have been inadequately provided for by their deceased parent.

By way of brief overview, the statutory framework operates as follows.

By s.1(1)(c) of the 1975 Act, a child of the deceased may apply to the court for an order under s.2 that the disposition of the deceased’s estate under their will failed to make “reasonable financial provision” for that child. What must be shown is not simply that the deceased acted unreasonably. The test is whether, looked at objectively, the deceased’s disposition or lack of disposition produces an unreasonable result (Ilott at [18], citing Oliver J in Re Coventry at 474).

By s.1(2)(b) of the 1975 Act, child claimants are limited to provision for their “maintenance”. The Supreme Court in Ilott provided guidance on the meaning of this term: ‘maintenance’ is broad, flexible, fact-specific, and not limited to a mere subsistence level (at [14]-[15]). Importantly, the need for maintenance is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for relief. Although the claimant need not establish a ‘moral claim’ to be maintained by the deceased, “something more than the qualifying relationship is needed to found a claim” by adult children who are well capable of living independently (Ilott at [20]-[21], clarifying dicta of Oliver J in Re Coventry at 475). What amounts to ‘something more’ is thus a frequent focus in such claims.

Section 2 of the Act sets out the orders which a court may make if it concludes that reasonable provision has not been made. Section 3 sets out the factors which the court must consider in determining whether or not the disposition of the deceased’s estate made ‘reasonable financial provision’, and (if not) whether and in what manner the court should exercise its powers.

Typically, claims under the 1975 Act are considered by reference to two discrete questions: (1) did the will/intestacy make reasonable financial provision for the claimant; and (2) if not, what reasonable financial provision ought now to be made?

Nonetheless, there is clearly a degree of overlap between the two: for example, factors such as the relationship between the deceased and the claimant, the needs of the claimant, and the competing claims of others will often be equally applicable to both stages. Ultimately, the judge must take a broad-brush approach in resolving both questions (Ilott at [23]-[24]).

The facts

The facts in Isaacs v Green were thorny, and perhaps best summarised by the judge as follows:

“This case is far from straightforward. I am faced with three siblings, all of whom are in their seventies, and all of whom have clear financial needs. None are now capable of earning a living, and two of them, David and Susan, have significant healthcare needs. On the other side of the equation there is a finite and diminishing pot of money that is plainly insufficient to meet all of their needs in full.” (at [66]).

The deceased was Sybil Isaacs, who died in April 2013. The claimant was her son, David Isaacs (aged 74). Sybil’s will made no provision for David, and her residuary estate was divided equally between her two adult daughters: David’s twin sister, Ruth, and their younger sister, Susan (aged 72). As at the date of trial, David was seeking one-third of the estate.

The administrator of Sybil’s estate (the First Defendant) was neutral, and played no active role in the trial. Ruth (the Second Defendant) supported David’s claim. Susan (the Third Defendant) was the only party who actively opposed David’s claim.

The factual matrix was complicated. In 2002, Sybil had made a mirror will leaving her estate to her husband, or (in the event he predeceased her) to all her three children equally. In 2006, Sybil amended her will to exclude David. Susan argued that this was because David had always had a very poor relationship with their mother. David argued that he was going through a divorce at the time, and that his mother was concerned that his ex-wife might have a claim on the estate: hence, his exclusion from the 2006 will. In any event, David argued that his relationship with his mother was positive at least by her final years, when he cared for her.

The issue was that, although David’s divorce was finalised in 2008, Sybil did not amend the terms of her 2006 will. By 2011, Sybil’s capacity was significantly impaired, and David moved into her property to care for her. After Sybil’s death in 2013, David and Ruth continued to live in the property. In 2021, an independent administrator was appointed over Sybil’s estate, and in 2024 began possession proceedings against David and Ruth in respect of the property.

As regards the personal circumstances of the siblings, the evidence was as follows:

1. 1. David suffered from multiple health conditions. He was retired, had a limited income and no savings, and lived in his late mother’s house with Ruth (also of modest means). Notably, David had an expensive coin-collecting habit, but otherwise lived extremely modestly. If the possession proceedings succeeded, he and Ruth would be left homeless.
   2. Susan lived in California, and suffered from a number of serious health problems which left her bed-ridden. She was dissatisfied with her current (publicly funded) residential placement, and sought to use her inheritance to improve this. However, her evidence regarding alternative care arrangements was insufficiently specific and “hopelessly unrealistic” (at [65]). She failed to demonstrate how any inheritance to which she might be entitled, even in full, would fund anything more than a limited period in private care.

The decision

Having heard the evidence from all parties, the judge concluded that David had been excluded from his mother’s will due to concerns about his marriage, and that, at least by the time of her death, their relationship was positive. Susan’s explanation of his disinheritance was rejected.

The judge was also satisfied that David was in genuine financial need. While the judge considered that David should be treated as having neither a need for income nor a surplus of income, his dependence on Ruth, and the likelihood of further costs arising, meant that he required maintenance provision to safeguard his right to accommodation in future. In answer to the first question, then, the will had failed to make reasonable financial provision for David (at [71]).

As to the second question, namely the form which such reasonable provision should take, the judge held that David should receive 25% of the estate, with the balance of the residuary estate to be shared equally between Ruth and Susan (at [76]). In numerical terms, David would thus receive around £150,000, with Ruth and Susan each receiving approximately £225,000.

The judge also made a number of supplemental orders. First, David and Ruth should be permitted to remain in the property for 6 months to purchase the property, or vacate it and find alternative accommodation. Second, they should compensate Susan for their continued occupation during such time. Third, the administrator should not enforce any possession order before that time period had expired, and should not pursue any claim for past mesne profits.

What about costs?

The judge took no account of potential liability for legal costs when assessing the financial needs and resources of any of the parties.

As regards David, this followed from the Supreme Court’s decision in Hirachand v Hirachand [2024] UKSC 43, approving the decision in Jassal v Shah [2024] EWHC 2214 (Ch) that litigation costs are exclusively governed by the cost regime under the CPR, so are not recoverable in any substantive award under the 1975 Act (at [60]).

As regards Susan, however, the position was slightly different, since she was not seeking any award under the 1975 Act. Nonetheless, the judge considered that it would be “wholly wrong” to ignore David’s legal costs, but take Susan’s legal costs into account when assessing her financial needs and resources as a beneficiary of the estate under s.3(1)(c) of the Act.

Ultimately, it was ordered that costs should follow the event: as such, Susan was ordered to pay 75% of David’s costs of the claim. The judge acknowledged (in a postscript) that his costs order would inevitably impact the financial outcome designed by his substantive award. However, that simply reflected the policy of the costs regime under the CPR 1998.

It is thus clear that the ‘no allowance for costs’ principle will be strictly applied in 1975 Act claims following Hirachand, notwithstanding any potential injustice. Parties are thus well advised to consider in advance the risks of running up significant legal costs which (even if they succeed) they will be unable to recover in any substantive award, and which the losing party may be unable to satisfy (particularly if their share of the estate has been reduced).

While Isaacs clearly turns on its own facts, there are a number of other interesting takeaways from the judgment, which may have broader application in similar claims.

Takeaway 1: What is ‘something more’?

As noted above, even if the need for any ‘moral obligation’ is on the wane following Ilott, adult children must still establish ‘something more’ than mere financial need and the parent-child relationship. In cases of estrangement, the effective lines of argument are likely to be twofold: either, that there was no estrangement, or that the estrangement itself (and thus the result of the disposition) was unreasonable or is outweighed by the claimant’s other legitimate needs.

Isaacs is an example of the former line of argument. David’s disinheritance under the 2006 will was explicable by other reasons (namely, Sybil’s concerns over his divorce), and the judge was satisfied on the evidence that, at least by Sybil’s final years, their relationship had mended. Indeed, the judge was particularly persuaded by Sybil’s description of David as a ‘good boy’, which he felt offered a “genuine insight” into their relations during this period (at [67]).

This can be compared to Howe v Howe [2025] (unreported, heard in January 2025),[1] a claim by an adult child under the Act. There, the deceased had excluded from his will his only child (the claimant), whom he described as “lazy”, “useless”, “grasping” and “druggy”. Despite their long estrangement, the judge held that the claimant’s health needs (which it was argued that the deceased had provoked) were nonetheless a compelling reason to make provision for her.

That is not to say that the search for a ‘moral claim’ has been extinguished altogether. In Re Bala (Deceased) [2023] EWHC 1054 (Ch), it was agreed that the will did not make reasonable financial provision for the claimant parties. Nonetheless, taking into account the adult child’s learning difficulties, limited quality of life and earning capacity, and closeness to the deceased, the judge considered that “her moral claim is a strong one” (at [161]).

As always, the answer will inevitably be fact specific. But it is notable that, in all three cases mentioned above, some form of impairment or disability (physical or mental) over and above financial necessity was asserted by the claimant. Particularly in cases where estrangement with the deceased is conceded or cannot be disproven, this may well be a ‘tipping factor’ likely to persuade a judge that any failure to make provision for the claimant was unreasonable.

Takeaway 2: What is ‘maintenance’?

In the past, ‘maintenance’ has been (narrowly) defined as connoting “only payment which, directly or indirectly, enables the applicant in the future to discharge the cost of his daily living at whatever standard of living is appropriate to him” (In re Dennis, deceased [1981] 2 All ER 140 per Browne-Wilkinson J at 145-146, cited with approval in Ilott at [14]).

In Isaacs, a notable feature of the judgment was the treatment of David’s collecting habit. Despite acknowledging that David was spending “a significant portion of his income” (around £450 per month) on collectible coins and stamps (at [40]), the judge also considered the fact that David otherwise lived with “great frugality”, and had not claimed provision for a number of other things which he might reasonably have claimed (e.g. meals out or modest holidays).

In the event, and bearing in mind that David would likely have to significantly curtail such expenditure in future, the judge was willing to adopt a broader definition of ‘maintenance’. “Whilst David’s coin collecting might not be a widely shared interest, I do not consider that the meaning of “maintenance” is so narrow that I should expect David to forego this interest entirely” (at [70]). The net effect of David’s expensive hobby and frugal lifestyle was thus neutral, and did not undermine his need for provision in respect of his accommodation.

This may be contrasted to cases where the definition of ‘maintenance’ is more strictly enforced. In Re Annan (Deceased) [2023] EWHC 662 (Ch), two adult brothers brought claims under the 1975 Act against their sister in respect of their late father’s estate. One brother was successful, but the other failed for lack of ‘need’. He claimed that provision was not made under the will for (inter alia) a lump sum to clear two major debts. However, neither debt came within the “broad concept of maintenance”: the first (a statutory charge on his house) was not yet due and imposed no financial burden in the meantime, while the second (a bounceback loan) was properly classed as a business expense (at [40]-[42]). As such, the claimant failed to show that his needs were not already met, which Ilott confirmed was a prerequisite for relief (at [95]).

In short, courts may be willing to apply a broad brush where the claimant can make out a real need for maintenance in one arena (e.g. accommodation), albeit not in another (e.g. income). However, again, the court’s willingness to find such a need will always turn on the facts. Claimants should therefore consider carefully how to frame their cases on need – bearing in mind that the concept of ‘maintenance’, while not inflexible, will only stretch so far.

Takeaway 3: What financial provision is ‘reasonable’?

As noted above, the judge in Isaacs decided to award David a 25% share of the estate. This unequal split was sufficient to cover accommodation for David if he were to live independently from Ruth (the maximum level of maintenance which the judge thought was appropriate), and it reflected David’s enjoyment of the property rent-free since his mother’s death (at [76]).

In Ilott, it was suggested that where housing is provided by way of maintenance, it is likely more often to be provided by way of a life interest than a capital sum (at [15]). However, the judge in Isaacs did not consider that to be appropriate where the estate was small, the siblings were all of a similar age, and a life interest would effectively shut Ruth and Susan out of a significant portion of capital for the rest of their lives (at [72]). This case is a good illustration of the breadth and flexibility of the discretion to order relief befitting the circumstances.

In Howe, by contrast, the claimant received an award of £125,000 structured to pay for (inter alia) a new car and other appliances; therapy and replacement breast implants; an income shortfall for a period of ten years; and, perhaps most strikingly, a £42,000 adverse costs order – the claimant had previously brought a claim challenging the validity of the will, which she withdrew, and was ordered to pay the executors’ costs (see Howe v Leck Holdings Ltd [2024] EWHC 1842 (Ch). However, the sum awarded was to be held in a discretionary trust to prevent the claimant from spending the money ‘unwisely’, and to preserve her entitlement to benefits. While the court has the power to structure awards as it sees fit, it may also control the claimant’s access to this: thereby ensuring that the envisaged financial outcome is satisfactorily achieved.

Finally, the court must always weigh the competing needs of other beneficiaries in the balance (s.3(1)(c) of the 1975 Act) – and will endeavour to do so, even where the evidence is lacking. In Dignam-Thomas v McCourt [2023] EWHC 546 (Fam), the second defendant had persistently refused to engage in proceedings, including by submitting evidence. Nonetheless, the judge rejected the “bold” submission by counsel for the first claimant that he should thereby be taken to have no competing needs which the court need take into account (at [50], [65(3)]). Rather, the judge preferred to proceed on the limited information which the court did have.

Evidentially speaking, then, something is usually better than nothing in designing a final award: judges will ‘do their best’, and apply a broad brush in order to achieve a reasonable outcome.

Practical takeaways

In addition to the substantive points of interest identified above, three more practical points may be derived from Isaacs, which are worth bearing in mind for practitioners.

Evidential basis. The importance of filing clear evidence is apparent throughout the judgment. Faced with unclear figures and impressionistic valuations (at [40], [50]), the judge repeatedly expressed his confusion in working out the true position (at [36], [55], [59]), and at points resorted to ‘reading between the lines’ of the witnesses’ evidence (at [49], [64]). Given that s.3 of the 1975 Act requires the court to consider the parties’ financial needs and resources, it is essential that clear, coherent and current evidence of such matters is before the court.

Litigants in person. Given that David and Ruth acted as litigants in person at trial, counsel for Susan (as the only represented party) was thanked for his “clear and helpful explanation” of the relevant legal principles (at [4]). It is to be expected that litigants in person may struggle to understand the trial process; all the more so in cases where emotions are already running high, and there is a quantity of contested factual evidence. As the judge observed, “the reality of [Susan] being cross-examined in person by her siblings meant that at times her evidence took on the air of a family argument” (at [60]). As such, clear, focused and (where appropriate) neutral submissions on the relevant law, agreed facts and matters in issue will likely be of even greater assistance to the court in reaching a just and efficient resolution of the case.

Fruitless litigation. The judgement concluded by noting that David and Ruth had made various allegations against the administrator, accusing him of seeking to profit from his office (at [82]). The judge dismissed such allegations as “wholly unfounded” and supported by “not one shred of evidence”. He also confessed himself to be “deeply troubled” that the limited resources in the estate might be depleted further by continued litigation, and urged all parties to consider the proportionality of further dispute (at [83]). The incidence of costly and counter-intuitive litigation is repeatedly a subject of judicial displeasure in such claims. Given that a neutral executor’s or administrator’s costs will very likely be recovered from the estate, but parties’ legal costs cannot form part of any substantive relief under the 1975 Act, claimants should be alert to the possibility that even a successful claim against the estate will ultimately be a Pyrrhic victory.

What’s next?

If the trends in the case law are indicative, an uptick in claims by adult children under the 1975 Act may well be imminent, particularly if contentious probate claims continue to rise overall (the data suggests that applications to block probate have increased by 56% since 2019).[2]

This rise may be attributable to a number of factors: an ageing population and associated concerns over capacity; an increasing number of blended families and second marriages, leading to inevitable testamentary complications; and the concentration of wealth (particularly, property wealth) among elder generations, such that younger generations are more dependent on inheritances to get onto the property ladder.

Against that backdrop, practitioners will want to have full grasp of the full armoury of probate claims and defences available. Claims by adult children under the 1975 Act are just one weapon in such an armoury – but one which, it seems, should no longer be underestimated. 

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[1] https://www.rothleylaw.com/news/rothley-law-secures-125000-for-estranged-daughter-in-landmark-inheritance-case/.

[2] https://todayswillsandprobate.co.uk/contentious-probate-up-by-as-much-as-56-according-to-freedom-of-information-request/.

 

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