Six Wilberforce barristers feature in two of The Lawyer’s Top 20 Cases of 2026
We are delighted to announce that Wilberforce barristers appear in two of The Lawyer’s Top 20 cases of 2026, identifying the upcoming year’s most-talked-about disputes. Six of our members are involved across the highlighted matters.
All England Lawn Tennis Ground v Save Wimbledon Park and HM’s Attorney General
James McCreath and Jonathan Chew act for the defendant, the All-England Club.
In this case, the expansion of the Wimbledon Tennis Championships hangs in the balance after a dispute between local residents and the All England Lawn Tennis Club. The outcome will decide whether Wimbledon can proceed with its biggest expansion in decades or whether the historic green space must remain protected from redevelopment.
Peter Waddell and another v Bluebell Cars Holding and others
Alan Gourgey KC, Anna Littler and Ernest Leung act for the claimants, Peter Waddell and Peter Waddell Holdco, and Rachael Earle acts for the defendant, Laurence Vaughan.
A dispute has arisen between Big Motoring World founder Peter Waddell and private equity investor Freshstream following Waddell’s removal from management after Freshstream acquired a minority stake in the business. The case concerns whether that removal was properly carried out under the investment agreement, in light of both the company’s performance and an investigation into Waddell’s conduct. The case goes to the heart of two prominent business issues, namely allegations of inappropriate conduct by senior executives, and the interaction of private equity investors with companies in which they have invested.
Subscribers to The Lawyer can read the full article here.
Court of Appeal dismisses appeal in solicitor’s professional negligence case
The Court of Appeal has today handed down judgment in Blower v GH Canfield LLP [2025] EWCA Civ 1627, considering issues around conflicts of interest for solicitors and the pleading of claims regarding the actions of third parties.
The case concerns alleged negligence by the Respondent in agreeing to a settlement at mediation whilst acting for the Appellant and various other members of her family, including her bankrupt husband. At first instance, His Honour Judge Paul Matthews had found in favour of the Respondent and that there was no negligence. He further found that if negligence had been established, there was no coherently pleaded case on causation. He was not asked to consider a claim for damages on a loss of a chance basis.
The Appellant was granted permission to appeal in relation to whether the Respondent was acting under a conflict of interest, and whether causation had been adequately pleaded. Both grounds were dismissed; the Judge had considered the case on conflict of interests as it had been pleaded and presented at trial, which was a much narrower basis than that argued on appeal. On causation, the Court accepted that the claim had been incoherently pleaded, and that the Judge had already given the Appellant latitude by going outside of the pleadings such that he could not then be criticised for failing to go further and consider a loss of a chance claim that was not before him.
The Judgment is a useful reminder of the importance of a Claimant ensuring that all elements of a claim are fully pleaded, especially as to causation and the need to particularise what would specifically have happened had there been no negligence as to cause the claimed loss.
Jonathan Seitler KC and Lemuel Lucan-Wilson acted for GH Canfield LLP at the trial below and in the Court of Appeal.
Court of Appeal decides tax and trusts case concerning meaning of “loss” in the context of gilt strip transactions
Watts v Commissioners for HM Revenue and Customs [2025] EWCA Civ 1615
Jonathan Davey KC has received judgment from the Court of Appeal in a case concerning a claim for tax relief on losses said to arise on the sale of gilt strips.
In circumstances where the taxpayer had acquired the gilt strips, granted an option over the strips to a trust of which he was life tenant, and then sold the strips to an investment bank which had acquired the benefit of the option from the trustees, the Court of Appeal held that the taxpayer had not sustained a loss on the transfer (other than a loss of less than 1% of the amount claimed) for the purposes of the phrase “the amount payable on the transfer” (paragraph 14A(3) of Schedule 13 to the Finance Act 1996).
Accordingly, the Court of Appeal upheld the conclusion of both the Upper Tribunal and First-tier Tribunal that on a purposive construction of the relevant legislation, the statutory language was to be interpreted more broadly than the Appellant contended for, and, therefore, on the facts of the case, the “transfer” in question comprised the aggregate of two amounts including, significantly, a payment made for the assignment of the option (as contended for by the Respondents) rather than just one amount, namely the sum paid on the exercise of the option (as contended for by the Appellant).
The Court of Appeal therefore determined the appeal in the Respondents’ favour. In the course of doing so, the Court of Appeal considered, amongst other cases, WT Ramsay Ltd v IRC [1982] AC 300, Berry v HMRC [2011] UKUT 81 (TCC) and Rossendale Borough Council v Hurstwood Properties (A) Ltd [2021] UKSC 16.
Jonathan Davey KC acts for the Respondents with Joshua Carey (Devereux Chambers). Aparna Nathan KC and Colm Kelly (Devereux Chambers) act for the Appellant.
“Interests means interests?”: Fetters on pension scheme amendment powers after 3i plc v Decesare
Article by Joseph Steadman
- In Gleeson v J. Wippell & Co [1977] 1 WLR 510, Megarry VC described the word “interest” as being of a “protean nature … a term which at times seems almost capable of meaning all things to all men”.
- Almost fifty years on, and in a wholly different context, the truth of that observation has been illustrated in the recent case of 3i plc v Decesare [2025] EWHC 3023 (Ch).
The context: the BBC case
- The meaning of the word “interest” in the context of a pension scheme amendment power has been brought into focus over the past couple of years following the decisions of the High Court [2023] EWHC 1965 (Ch) and Court of Appeal [2024] EWCA Civ 767 in British Broadcasting Corporation v BBC Pension Trust Limited.
- The fetter in the BBC case provided that no alteration or modification could take effect “as regards the Active Members whose interests are certified by the Actuary to be affected thereby” (emphasis added) unless certain conditions were satisfied.
- The Court of Appeal upheld the High Court’s decision that in that context, the word “interests” included “the ability of members to accrue future service benefits under the scheme as it stood before any variation”. (For more detail on the BBC case, see my notes on the High Court and Court of Appeal)
- That unusual outcome – the first time that the Court of Appeal had ever found that a fetter on a pension scheme’s amendment power protected future service benefits, and only the second time any other domestic court had done so – prompted many pension schemes to reconsider a longstanding assumption that fetters on pension scheme amendment powers will naturally be construed as protecting only members’ past service benefits rather than their future service benefits. Schemes began to look back over years, or even decades, to see whether the validity of past amendments night be called into question.
The question: the 3i Pension Plan
- One such pension scheme was the 3i Pension Plan (the “Plan”). Although the fetter to the relevant amendment power was worded differently from the fetter in the BBC case, it also used the word “interests”. If the meaning of the word “interests” included future service benefits, then that would call into question the validity of a deed made in 2010 which had purportedly closed the Plan to further accrual (the “Closure Deed”).
- In the many years since 2010, all parties had worked on the basis that the Closure Deed was valid and that the Plan had been closed to further accrual. Indeed, 3i had provided a separate defined contribution arrangement to its employees.
- Fast-forward to 2024, and the Plan was in the process of winding up. That meant that the question the BBC case raised regarding the validity of the Closure Deed was of immediate practical importance. As part of the winding up process, and on the footing that the Closure Deed had brought to an end the accrual of benefits, individual annuities had been issued and assigned to members. That left a surplus – estimated to be approximately £83 million – which the Plan trustees proposed (following a statutory consultation process) to pay to the employer.
- Before taking a final decision as to the distribution of the surplus, the Trustees considered it appropriate to obtain confirmation from the court as to the meaning of the fetter and in turn the validity of the Closure Deed. 3i therefore commenced proceedings asking the Court to determine that question.
- The fetter on the Plan’s amendment power provided that no modification could be made if it would “… diminish any pension already being paid under the Plan or the accrued rights or interests of any Member or other person in respect of benefits already provided under the Plan …” (emphasis added).
- The question for the Court was therefore whether the word “interests” was – as in the BBC case – so broad as to include future service benefits, or whether it was limited to past service benefits.
The answer: “it depends”
- The Court was clear that it was necessary to consider the fetter on the Plan’s amendment power on its own terms. As Lewison LJ had pointed out in the BBC case at [28], fetters on pension scheme amendment powers may bear a “family resemblance” but ultimately the meaning of a particular clause turns on its own interpretation (i.e. its specific wording, interpreted in context).
- The fact that the word “interests” was construed broadly in the BBC case – where it appeared “untethered to any composite phrase” – did not mean that it should be construed broadly in the context of the Plan.
- In fact, as Richard Smith J put it at [69]:
… it is pertinent in my view that, far from being “untethered”, the word “interests” in this case does feature in a composite phrase. It also features in conjunction with the word “rights”. Both words are then qualified by the same expression “already provided under the Plan”, echoing the “already being paid” language of the first element. There is nothing in that composite phrase to suggest that the relevant “interests” are concerned with future service accrual. To the contrary, and reinforced by the word “accrued” before “rights or interests”, its focus is very much on what has already occurred.
- Moreover, there was nothing in the surrounding context – such as the way the words “interests” and “rights” were used elsewhere in the Plan’s governing documents – which justified a departure from that conclusion.
- In the context of the Plan, therefore, “interests” referred only to past service benefits, and it followed that the fetter had not prevented the making of the Closure Deed.
- The Court’s decision indicates once again that it is futile to search for a single meaning of the word “interests”. The true answer is “it depends”. As Lewison LJ put it in the BBC case at [49]:
…it is a fallacy to treat the words of an English sentence as building blocks whose meaning cannot be affected by the rest of the sentence. The unit of communication by means of language is the sentence and not the parts of which it is composed. The significance of individual words is affected by other words and the syntax of the whole.
- In other words, the decision in the BBC case showed that the word “interests” could be so broad as to include the ability to accrue future service benefits, not that the word “interests” would always be construed in that way.
The future: all clear?
- To some extent, pension scheme employers and trustees can breathe a sigh of relief. There is now clear authority that a fetter which includes the word “interests” will not necessarily be construed as including the ability to accrue future service benefits.
- However, it will still be important to consider on what basis it can be said that the meaning of the word “interests” is limited to past service benefits, for example by being “tethered” to a “composite phrase” such as “accrued interests” or “interests in the fund”. And where that cannot be said with certainty, it may well remain necessary to seek confirmation from the court before taking significant decisions such as whether to make a distribution of surplus.
Joseph Steadman appeared with Brian Green KC as Counsel for 3i plc in 3i plc v Decesare, instructed by Slaughter and May. He writes here in his personal capacity.
Fenner Moeran KC acted for the First Defendant, John Decesare (representative member of the 3i Group Pension Plan), instructed by Burges Salmon.
Michael Tennet KC acted for the Second and Third Defendants (trustees of the 3i Group Pension Plan), instructed by Linklaters.
Part 26A Restructuring Plan case concerning Argo Blockchain features in Global Restructuring Review
Following a hearing on 5 November 2025, Hildyard J granted the Argo Blockchain Plc’s (the Company) application to convene three separate Part 26A Restructuring Plan Meetings, one each for: (i) the Shareholders, (ii) Noteholders, and (iii) the Secured Lender (Growler). Under the terms of the proposed Restructuring Plan, Growler’s secured debt would be subject to full equitisation into new ordinary shares in the Company (held as American Depositary Shares) together with a release of Growler’s secured interests in the UK, US and Canadian subsidiaries. Therefore, upon implementation of the Restructuring Plan, Growler would receive 87.5 per cent of the issued share capital in the Company, in exchange for: (i) the conversion of its $7.5 million secured loan to equity, (ii) the contribution of $3.5 million of exit capital, and (iii) the contribution to the Company of assets valued between $25 to 30 million. The Noteholders would receive a pro rata allocation of 10 per cent of the total issued share capital of the Company, whilst the current Shareholders would be diluted to 2.5 per cent of the new total issued share capital of the Company. Finally, it is proposed that the Company delists from the LSE whilst it intends to keep its Nasdaq listing.
Daniel Jukes acted (unled) for the Retail Advocate, Jon Yorke, at the Convening Hearing.
To read more about the case in Global Restructuring Review please click the link below:
Judgment handed down in Ricardo Salinas Pliego v Astor Asset Management
On 13 November 2025, judgment was handed down by Stephen Houseman KC in the case of Ricardo Salinas Pliego v Astor Asset Management [2025] EWHC 2968.
John Wardell KC, instructed by LK Law, acted for the claimants, Mr Salinas and Corporation RBS, who are the alleged victims of an alleged $400 million stock lending fraud carried out by Mr Sklarov – the 4th Defendant. Mr Sklarov had allegedly funded $75 million of a $115 million loan by secretly selling the shares put up as collateral.
The Defendants applied to strike out the proceedings, arguing that Black Cube’s conduct constituted an abuse of process. The Claimants maintained that the evidence was admissible as it did not extend beyond material already in the public domain and, in any event, fell within the iniquity principle and was therefore not privileged.
The Judge failed to determine the public domain and iniquity principles and refused to strike out the claim. However, he held that the Claimants had forfeited the right to bring a summary judgment application as a result of Black Cube’s conduct.
Judgment handed down in Romal Capital (C02) Limited v Peel L&P (Ports) Limited
Judgment was handed down today in Romal Capital (C02) Limited v Peel L&P (Ports) Limited, following a three-week trial in May-June 2025.
The case concerns a plot within the ambitious Liverpool Waters redevelopment of Liverpool’s historic docklands. Property developer Romal successfully established that Peel had breached contractual obligations requiring it to use all reasonable endeavours to assist Romal with securing planning permission for a development of more than 600 apartments on the plot. In the end, Romal managed to secure consent for a substantially smaller scheme. Mr Justice Fancourt found that, because of Peel’s failures to support the scheme through the planning process, Romal had lost the opportunity to make the substantially greater profits that would have flowed from a larger development.
The judgment contains an illuminating example of how to approach a ‘loss of a chance’ claim where there are number of hypothetical outcomes and a number of chances lost, as well as a useful discussion on the different ways of valuing a business’s lost profit.
Joanne Wicks KC and Emer Murphy, alongside Lord Banner KC, acted for Romal, instructed by a fantastic team at Clyde & Co LLP (Keith Conway, Robert Wood and Alexander Mak).
Part 26A Restructuring Plan case concerning Fossil Group features in Global Restructuring Review
On 15 October 2025, Cawson J convened a single class meeting of creditors of Fossil (UK) Global Services so that creditors could vote on whether to sanction a Part 26A Restructuring Plan. Fossil (UK) Global Services is an English subsidiary of the US headquartered Fossil Group which is an international fashion designer and manufacturer. Under the Restructuring Plan, Fossil proposed to restructure $150,000,000 7 per cent senior unsecured notes which were due to mature in November 2026.
Daniel Jukes acted (unled) for the Retail Advocate, Jon Yorke, at the Convening Hearing.
Judgment handed down in Lee v BDB Pitmans LLP
On 5 November 2025 judgment was handed down by Caroline Shea KC, sitting as a deputy high court judge, in Lee v BDB Pitmans LLP [2025] EWHC 2881 (Ch), a decision concerning the much-litigated question of the circumstances in which the court can order substitution of a party under CPR r.19.6 after the limitation period has expired. The lengthy and detailed judgment also surveys issues of novation, estoppel and the relatively obscure doctrine of acknowledgment.
Thomas Grant KC led Ryan Turner of Maitland Chambers, instructed by Martin Scott and Sarah Proctor of Milners Solicitors, on behalf of the successful Claimants.
Permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal has been granted in: Almacantar Centre Point Nominee Ltd v De Valk and Others
Martin Hutchings KC and Harriet Holmes, instructed by Bryan Cave Leighton Paisner LLP, on behalf of their landlord client, Almacantar, have secured permission to appeal from the decision of the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) to the Court of Appeal in case of Almacantar Centre Point Nominee Ltd v De Valk and Others [2025] UKUT 298 (LC).
The appeal raises a number of fundamental issues relating to the Building Safety Act 2022 and the protections given to leaseholders in respect of service charge recovery for ‘cladding remediation’ work, including:
- Whether cladding remediation under the Act only applies in respect of ‘relevant defects’ or whether the Act’s provisions in fact apply to a much wider class of buildings and much wider types of landlord’s repair work;
- What the Act means in Part 5 where it refers to the un-defined terms: ‘cladding’ and ‘cladding system’; as well as the term ‘cladding remediation’;
- What is meant by ‘unsafe’ in this context.
The Court of Appeal’s decision on each of these points will break new ground. There is no binding authority directly addressing these points.
Our previous post in relation to the Upper Tribunal’s decision, with a link to the judgment of the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber), may be found here:
Summary of Upper Tribunal decision